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WHERE ARE THE NATURAL NUMBERS IN HILBERT’S
FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY?
PHIL SCOTT AND JACQUES D FLEURIOT
Abstract. Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry was perhaps one of the most
influential works of geometry in the 20th century and its axiomatics was the
first systematic attempt to clear up the logical gaps of the Elements. But does
it have gaps of its own? In this paper, we discuss a logical issue, asking how
Hilbert is able to talk about natural numbers within a foundational synthetic
geometry. We clarify the matter, showing how to obtain the natural numbers
using a very modest subset of his axioms.
1. Introduction
It has been argued that the Pythagoreans took their philosophical foundations
to be the natural numbers [13], and if so, the discovery of irrational numbers marks
the first crisis in the foundations of mathematics. By the time of Euclid, the theory
of natural numbers was grounded instead on supposedly more secure geometric
notions, and placed on par with an equally rich theory of rational and irrational
magnitudes.
We see these ideas in Euclid’s Elements [7], possibly one of the most influential
books in history [2], and possibly the most famous textbook in mathematics. Its
presentation of axiomatic geometry went largely unquestioned until the 19th cen-
tury. Then, as mathematicians were becoming more attentive to logical principles,
Pasch and Hilbert concluded that the text contained missing assumptions. To be
truly rigorous, Pasch had declared that the process of inference in all proofs should
be entirely independent of the meaning of any geometrical term [12], while David
Hilbert, anticipating his own “formalist programme”, is famously reported to have
said that “mug”, “table”, and “chair” should be substitutes for “point”, “line” and
“plane” [17]. The conclusion of this view was Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry,
in which Euclid’s five axioms became nineteen axioms, organised into five groups.
As Poincare´ explained in his review of the first edition of the Foundations of
Geometry [8], we can understand this idea of rigour in terms of a purely mechanical
symbolic machine. If one feeds the axioms in as input, then all of Hilbert’s theorems
should be delivered as output. Thus, we guarantee that intuition does not hide
implicit axioms relating the primitive concepts, since a purely mechanical machine
has no such intuitions.
Such a mechanical symbolic approach to mathematics was made in earnest by
Russell and Whitehead when they wrote their Principia, albeit without the aid of
a real logic machine. The task was clearly laborious. Poincare´ remarked derisively
that “if it requires 27 equations to establish that 1 is a number, how many will it
require to demonstrate a real theorem?” [9]. Russell admitted that he never fully
recovered from the effort.
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Now with modern computers and automated theorem provers, the effort is
greatly alleviated. Machines can now check enormous symbolic proofs far more
quickly and reliably than any human. Furthermore, the machines assist us with
book-keeping and cross-referencing, and relieve us the burden of generating the
tedious and simple details that Poincare´ presumably considered “puerile”. In fact,
with the invention of Herbert Simon’s mechanical Logic Theorist, Russell was forced
to reflect on ten years writing proofs by hand as a “wasted” effort [1]. For two ex-
cellent introductions to computer assisted formalisation, suitable for non-experts,
see Hales [4] and Harrison [5].
In keeping with Poincare´’s mechanistic conclusion of logical rigour, we now assure
the reader that the work in this paper has been backed up by symbolic definitions
and proofs that have been fully formalised and machine-checked using the theorem
prover HOL Light [6]. However, for readability, we present our results in the more
familiar, and perhaps less “puerile”, mathematical vernacular.
Now as we found when we attempted to formalise Hilbert’s theory, there are
some subtle representation issues and choices to be made concerning the underlying
logic [15]. In this paper, we are concerned with just one issue: the logical status of
the natural numbers.
2. N in The Foundations of Geometry
Definition 4 of Book V of the Elements reads:
Magnitudes are said to have a ratio to one another which can, when
multiplied, exceed one another.
The way this is used makes it clear that it should have been an axiom, an issue
that was corrected in the Foundations of Geometry, where it appears as Axiom V, 1
along with an axiom of completeness.
V, 1 (Axiom of measure or Archimedes’ Axiom). If AB and CD are
any segments then there exists a number n such that n segments
CD constructed contiguously from A, along the ray from A through
B, will pass beyond the point B.
V, 2 (Axiom of line completeness). An extension of a set of points
on a line with its order and congruence relations that would preserve
the relations existing among the original elements as well as the
fundamental properties of line order and congruence that follows
from Axioms I-III, and from V, 1 is impossible.
In this last group of axioms in Hilbert’s system, the assumed logic is substantially
stronger than that assumed in the earlier groups. In the first axiom, we are told
there exist natural numbers dependent on segments. Natural numbers have not
been defined at this point in the text, so here, they are being treated as a logical
primitive. This matter seems incongruent with Euclid’s Elements, which treated
the natural numbers geometrically.
And in Axiom V, 2, Hilbert is quantifying over sets of points. But the combina-
tion of a second-order logic with a theory of natural numbers gives us second-order
arithmetic, wherein we can obtain a model of the real numbers. What is the logical
priority here? Is the basic logic here as strong as second-order arithmetic, or should
we try to recover natural numbers from geometrical notions? To answer this ques-
tion, we note that Hilbert wanted to avoid the complexity of analysis and produce
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• A and B lie on a;
• A and C lie on b;
• B and C lie on c;
• A and D lie on d;
• B and D lie on e;
• C and D lie on f .
• A, B and C lie on plane α;
• A, B and D lie on plane β;
• A, C and D lie on plane γ;
• B, C and D lie on plane δ.
Figure 1. Finite Model of Group I
a strictly synthetic theory [14], and he went to great length in later chapters to
define an arithmetic based on magnitudes. Thus, it would seem we should define
the natural numbers geometrically. The question then is where would the definition
appear?
3. Group I
The first and largest group contains eight axioms to define properties of inci-
dence. There are three primitive domains, namely points, lines and planes, and
two primitive relations, one for point-line incidence, and another for point-plane
incidence.
It turns out that the axioms governing these two relations can be minimally
realised in four vertices A, B, C, D, six lines a, b, c, d, e, f , and the four planes
ABC, ABD, ACD and BCD of a tetrahedron (see Figure 1). That is, we can
prove that 14 objects in certain relations satisfy the axioms, and prove that the
axioms commit us to at least these 14 objects.
Since finite models are possible for the first group of axioms, we know we cannot
derive the existence of an infinite collection such as the natural numbers. Thus, we
look to the second group of axioms.
4. Group II
The next group of axioms concern order and orientation in terms of a primitive
three-place predicate of betweenness, with which we can state that one point lies
strictly between two others along a line. The axioms to govern this notion are given
in Figure 2.
These axioms have been heavily revised since the first edition as various redun-
dancies were discovered. Originally, Axiom II, 2 had an additional clause asserting
that we can always find a point between two others. This turned out to be derivable
and is Theorem 3 in the tenth edition. Axiom II, 2 is then effectively a rigorous
formulation of the second postulate of the Elements, allowing us to continue a finite
straight line (or line segment) along a straight line. Unlike Euclid’s formulation,
the use of the betweenness relation makes it clear that this is an axiom of order.
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II,1 If a point B lies between a point A and a point C then the points A, B, C
are three distinct points of a line, and B then also lies between C and A.
II,2 For two points A and C, there always exists at least one point B on the
line AC such that C lies between A and B.
II,3 Of any three points on a line there exists no more than one that lies between
the other two.
II,4 Let A, B, C be three points that do not lie on a line and let a be a line in
the plane ABC which does not meet any of the points A, B, C. If the line
a passes through a point of the segment AB, it also passes through a point
of the segment AC, or through a point of the segment BC.
Figure 2. Group II axioms
THEOREM 3. For any two points A and C there always exists at
least one point D on the line AC that lies between A and C.
THEOREM 4. Of any three points A, B, C on a line there always
is one that lies between the other two.
THEOREM 5. Given any four points on a line, it is always possible
to label them A, B, C, D in such a way that the point labeled B
lies between A and C and also between A and D, and furthermore,
that the point labeled C lies between A and D and also between B
and D.
THEOREM 6 (generalization of Theorem 5). Given any finite num-
ber of points on a line it is always possible to label them A, B, C,
D, E, . . ., K in such a way that the point labelled B lies between
A and C, D, E, . . ., K, the point labelled C lies between A, B, and
D, E, . . ., K, D lies between A, B, C and E, . . ., K, etc. Besides
this order of labelling there is only the reverse one that has the
same property.
THEOREM 7. Between any two points on a line there exists an
infinite number of points.
Figure 3. Some Group II Theorems
In the first edition, there were further redudancies and these too were later
removed1. The quantification in Axiom II, 3 was stronger, claiming that, given
three points, there is exactly one that lies between the other two. By the tenth
edition, the existence of the point was derived as Theorem 4 in a proof attributed
to Wald [10]. Finally, a “transitivity” axiom was removed to become Theorem 5,
the proof due to Moore [16]. The theorems are given in Figure 3.
After revising, the Group II axioms consist of constraints on the between relation,
an axiom to extend a line segment in a given direction, and finally a planar axiom
of order. This last axiom, depicted in Figure 4, was identified by Pasch as a
crucial missing postulate from Euclid’s Elements. It is used heavily in the proofs of
Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, each of which starts with a linear assumption, builds a
planar diagram, and then uses Axiom II, 4 repeatedly to produce a linear conclusion.
1This despite Hilbert’s claim in the metatheory of his first edition that his axioms were clearly
independent!
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Figure 4. Axiom II, 4
5. Infinity
Hilbert does not give a proof for Theorem 7, but it claims here that the axioms
now only have infinite models. Indeed, we could presumably apply Theorem 3
repeatedly to obtain as many points as desired between two others. We start with
distinct points A and C, and then obtain points D, E, F , . . ., Y , Z such that the
point D is between A and C, the point E is between A and D, the point F is
between A and E, . . . and the point Y is between A and Z.
We just need to prove that these points are distinct, and for this, we can use
Theorem 5. We know that if D is between A and C and E is between A and D,
that E must also be between A and C. And thus, we know that these points are
distinct. Repeating this line of reasoning therefore gives us a potentially infinite
number of distinct points.
This is not enough to give us the natural numbers unless we can logically “carve
out” the results of this process into something which we can quantify over. For us,
it suffices that we can exhibit such a process as a function.
6. A Geometric Successor
The function we need is the traditional successor function, and it is possible to
witness such a function as a unique object in Group II. We have chosen our witness
to have two properties: firstly, it can be understood as a formalisation of Hilbert’s
Theorem 7; secondly, the points obtained by the successor function are uniquely
defined (unlike the potential infinity of points from the previous section, which we
would have to obtain via the axiom of choice). The witness is based on the diagram
in Figure 5.2
Formally, each diagram is a set of points A, B, C, D, N and 0, satisfying the
constraints in Figure 6. The fact that points exist satisfying these constraints is
proven in Theorem 3, which uses a diagram exactly as shown in Figure 5(a).
Each diagram is represented by six points. The points A, B, C, D and 0 are fixed
under the successor function, while the pointN is moved closer to A. Note, however,
that at this stage, we only have axioms governing incidence and orientation. In
particular, the first two groups of axioms are consistent with a geometry allowing
2Note that in the diagram, we could have switched the labels, using 0, 1, 2, . . . to denote the
moving point D′.
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Figure 5. The successor function
(1) the points A, B and 0 are not collinear;
(2) the point B lies between A and C;
(3) the point 0 lies between C and D;
(4) either:
(a) the point N lies between A and 0, or
(b) N = 0
infinitely small distances. So, if the point B was infinitely close to C, then the
points 1, 2, 3, . . . would be infinitely close to 0. This does not affect the fact that
we have a successor function, but is worth bearing in mind nevertheless: when it
comes to working in the foundations of geometry, diagrams are often misleading.
They represent many more assumptions than are normally in force.
The set of these diagrams is not, of course, provably isomorphic to the natural
numbers. In the model of Euclidean geometry, for instance, the set of geometrically
similar3 diagrams is isomorphic to an interval of real numbers. To obtain the
3Note that we do not have enough axioms at this stage to define this notion.
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naturals, we use induction as in set theory or simple type theory [3], whereby we
intersect all sets of diagrams which contain a chosen 0 and are closed under our
successor function. It is then sufficient to prove that this successor function is
one-one and not onto (something normally taken as axiomatic).
Informally, and for the purposes of explaining our formalisation, we will identify
diagrams by the point N . In this way, when we talk of the object 0, we may be
referring to the diagram 0, which are the six points shown in Figure 5(a) or to the
point 0, which is just one of these six points. Similarly, we shall talk about the
diagram that is the successor of 0, as well as the point that is the successor of 0.4
Thus, the successor of 0 is the diagram obtained by replacing 0 with 1, the inter-
section of BD and A0. To obtain the next successor, we first find the intersection
of C1 and AD, namely the point D′. We then replace 1 with the intersection of
BD′ and A0.
In general, the successor of a diagram is obtained by finding D′, the intersection
of CN and AD, and then finding the intersection of BD′ and A0. Formally, if A,
B, C, D, 0 and N are a diagram, then the successor to this diagram are the points
A, B, C, D, 0 and that provably unique S such that there is a point D′ with:
(1) the points C, D′ and N collinear;
(2) the points B, D′ and S collinear;
(3) the points A, D and D′ collinear;
(4) S lying between A and 0;
(5) S lying between A and N .
We just need to show that these points satisfy the constraints given in Figure 6.
The key step is to notice that the diagrams involving the points A,B,C, 0, D and
A,B,C,N,D′ satisfy the same constraints. In each case, we apply Axiom II, 4
to 4AC0 and the line BD′ to locate a point S between A and 0. For our initial
diagram, we can apply this argument directly. For the other diagrams, we just need
to find the point D′.
To do this, we apply Axiom II, 4 to 4A0D and the line BN , to place the point
D′ between A and D. We can now use the previous argument to locate S between
A and N . Finally, since N is between A and 0, Theorem 5 shows that the point S
must also lie between A and 0.
With our function defined, we must show that it satisfies the crucial property of
being a successor function: namely, that it is one-one but not onto (and thus that
the set of points in its image are Dedekind-infinite). We can show that the function
is one-one by reasoning about incidence alone, and it is clearly not onto since the
point 0 defines the first diagram, while all images of our successor function use a
point S which is strictly between A and 0.
7. Conclusion
We have derived the existence of a set of natural numbers using just the first two
groups of Hilbert’s axiom system. Ordinarily, the existence of such a set would be
taken as axiomatic, as is the case in ZF set theory5. But this is not necessary, and
was sometimes considered logically questionable. In the Principia, Russell declared
that the existence of an actual infinity of natural numbers was an empirical, not
4In our machine-checked formalisation, these matters are necessarily unambiguous.
5Strictly speaking, the axiom of infinity in ZF set theory merely says there is a set containing
zero and closed under successor.
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logical matter. Hilbert himself would later argue that the infinite is merely a useful
device, and not a logical given [11].
But in Hilbert’s geometry, we can understand natural numbers as just another
geometric concept. They are, in our formalism, a set of diagrams involving a
triangle, each generated from its predecessor by applying Axiom II, 4. Thus, when
Hilbert mentions natural numbers in his text (such as when formalising Axiom V, 1)
we can understand him to be implicitly using a derivative geometric notion, one
that we have now explicated based on his first two groups of axioms.
This makes explicit a gap in the Foundations of Geometry, and helps us realise
synthetic geometry as a true foundation for number theory, as it was understood
by its predecessor, the Elements.
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